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Avoided?
1LHE FEDERAL RESERVE System has been
criticized often for the secrecy that surrounds
monetary policy. In particular, many observers
have questioned the desirability of the Fed’s
practice of not disclosing the decisions of the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) im-
mediately following its meeting. This criticism
has been heightened recently by legislation in-
troduced in the House of Representatives, pro-
posing, among other things, that the Fed release
the contents of the FOMC’s directives immediate-
ly after each meeting rather than with a seven-
week delay.1
The economic rationale behind this proposal is
that the Fed’s maintained secrecy limits the in-
formational content ofprices in financial markets
and thereby detracts from the markets’ ability
to allocate resources efficiently. If, for example,
the FOMC voted to maintain its current policy
stance but subsequently added reserves to the
banking system as a technical and temporary
action, market participants might mistakenly in-
terpret such an action as a fundamental change
in policy. According to this view, without im-
mediate disclosure of the FOMC’s policy direc-
tive, confusion about the Fed’s intentions can
add to the variability of market interest rates.
Those who are skeptical of the value of this
legislation argue that immediate disclosure of
the FOMC’s directive would complicate the im-
plementation of monetary policy.2 For example,
the markets’ response to announcements could
generate large changes in interest rates that, ac-
cording to this view, would be excessive and
destabilizing.
‘Lee Hamilton and Byron Dorgan, HR2735-the Federal
Reserve Reform Act of 1989. See Hamilton (1989) for a
brief discussion of the key changes in the structure of the
Fed proposed by this legislation. As discussed by Good-
friend (1986), however, legislation proposed in this spirit is
not new.
2See, for example, Mooney (1989), Rosenbaum (1989) and
Uchitelle (1989). Also, see Goodfriend (1986) for an in-
teresting and useful critique of the arguments made for
maintained secrecy at the Fed.a
In the context of a relatively simple game-
theoretic model of monetary policy, in which
the Central Bank would expect to be better off
if it had no private information, this article
shows why the Central Bank cannot reveal its
private information credibly and precisely. The
Central Bank might be able to reveal this infor-
mation partially through imprecise or noisy an-
nouncements. From the Central Bank’s perspec-
tive, however, such announcements are not
costless, nor can they remove secrecy from poli-
cy perfectly. Hence, the analysis illustrates that,
even if the Central Bank perceived monetary
policy secrecy as undesirable, fully eliminating it
might not be feasible.
STRATEGIC MONETARY POLICY:
THE BASIC MODEL
To address issues of secrecy in monetary
policy, it is helpful to study a model of monetary
policy that specifies the objectives and constraints
faced by a Central Bank. Given the particular
specification, the model provides a framework
for analyzing various strategies for the Central
Bank and, in turn, for predicting which strategy
is optimal for the Central Bank. The model, a
slight variant of Canzoneri (1985), builds on a
simple specification of the economy.3 Output is
given by
(1) y,=yTh-(p,~wj,
where y,, p, and w~denote, respectively, the
logarithms of output, prices and nominal wages
in time t; yfl denotes the log of output that cor-
responds to the “natural” rate ofunemployment.
In this model, the natural level of output is the
one that would prevail with a steady rate of
inflation.
The public attempts to specify wages so as to
minimize deviations of output from its natural
level. Accordingly, it wants to set w,=p,. But, in
this model, prices are not known at the time
wages are set. Hence, wages are set to satisfy
(2) w,=p,
where p denotes the public’s expectation, as
described below, of the log of the price level
conditional on information available to the public
at the beginning of period t. By combining equa-






1 is the actual rate of inflation
in time t; n~=p—p,.. denotes the public’s expec-
tation of inflation.
Equation 3 captures the notion that the long-
run Phillips curve, which is the relationship
(trade-off) between inflation and unemployment,
is vertical. On average, unemployment and, con-
sequently, output are independent of both ex-
pected and actual inflation. In any period, how-
ever, unanticipated inflation can create a wedge
between output and its natural level. Specifical-
ly, the existence of contracts that fix nominal
wages for a specific period means that actual
output can depart from its natural level if people
underestimate or overestimate the future rate
of inflation.~The effect of unanticipated infla-
tion on output is only temporary. In this model,
it lasts only one period. The variance of output
implied by equation 3 is simply the variance of
the market’s inflation forecast error.
The following simple variation of the quantity
theory equation describes how prices are deter-
mined in each period given monetary policy:
(4) p,=m,-y~+v,,
where v, denotes an innovation to money de-
mand and m, denotes the log of the money
supply in time t.
Taking the first-difference of equation 4 and
rearranging shows how monetary policy affects
inflation:
(5) it,=g,—6,,
where g, m, —m,3 is the growth rate of
money, the Central Bank’s policy instrument,
and d,=v,, —v, denotes a random disturbance.
This disturbance, which is bounded between
~Themodel is intended only to be an illustration, not a
complete characterization ofthe economy. Canzoneri’s
(1985) model resembles that of Barro and Gordon (1983)
except that it provides a role for the Central Bank to react
to shocks. As will be evident below, this model does not
imply that the first-best policy is a constant money growth
rule. Rather, it is a contingent money growth rule. See
Cukierman (1986) for a helpful review of this relatively new
literature on central bank behavior.
4That unanticipated inflation can drive output above its
natural level would also be implied by the Lucas-type
(1973) supply curve. The important feature ofthis equa-
tion—that output, on average, will be independent of
inflation—assumes that the public forms expectations ra-
tionally. The assumption that the elasticity of output with
respect to unanticipated inflation is equal to one is used to
simplify the notation and does not affect the qualitative
rosuits discussed below except where noted.a
—D and +D, is assumed to have a zero uncon-
ditional mean and a finite, constant variance, o~.
As revealed by equation 5, the Central Bank’s
control over inflation is imperfect; inflation
depends not only on monetary policy but on the
disturbance to money demand. Thus, equation 5
implies that the public’s expectation for inflation
in time t equals the difference between its ex-
pectation of money growth in time t, g~,and its
expectation of 6,, 6.
Secrecy arises in this model because, in con-
trast to the public, the Central Bank has a (non-
trivial) forecast of the disturbance to money de-
mand.~The Central Bank’s “private” forecast,
d,eE,{d,}, satisfies
(6) d,”d~+s,,
where E{ } denotes the Central Bank’s expec-
tation, based on information available to it at
the beginning of period -r, before wage con-
tracts are signed. The Central Bank’s forecast
error, e,, has an expected value of zero, a finite
variance, o~,and no correlation with the Central
Bank’s forecast. The assumption that the forecast
is independent of the forecast error implies Ol =
+o~,where o~is the variance of the private
forecast.
Although this forecast is made just before
wages are set, the markets’ expectation of 6,
equals zero without any meaningful announce-
ments by the Central Bank, When the Central
Bank does not attempt to convey its private in-
formation, it~=g~. The public observes 6, after
policy is implemented when it, is realized. The
public, however, cannot infer from that obser-
vation what the Central Bank’s forecast had
been. Similarly, it cannot identify the Central
Bank’s forecast error. (See figure 1 which sum-
marizes the sequence of events during any
period t.) Nevertheless, people understand the
Central Bank’s objectives as described below
and its constraints subject to the unknown dis-
turbance 6,; they incorporate that understand-
ing into their expectations of money growth
and, accordingly, their wage specification.
Following Canzoneri (1985), the analysis
assumes that the Central Bank has two goals:
output and inflation stabilization. Its expected
lifetime utility in period t= 1 is given by
(7a) U1
= I fl’~E,{u,}, o</3<l
where
(7b) u,= —(y,—y’)2—fOt, —ir’12, f>~j
/3 is the Central Bank’s discount factor,°The
parameter fi sthe weight the Central Bank
places on its objective of stabilizing inflation
around its target level, it’, relative to its objec-
tive of hitting its target for the log of output,
y* - These targets are given and fixed parameters.
The Central Bank’s inflation target need not
be zero. But its objective to stabilize inflation is
consistent with the public’s objective to forecast-
ing future inflation correctly. In other words,
by minimizing the variability of inflation, the
Central Bank minimizes the variance of the pub-
lic’s inflation forecast error. The Central Bank’s
5That the public does not have a forecast of 6, implies
d;=O, providing that the Central Bank does not com-
municate to the public its own forecast. Note that it is not
crucial that the public has no forecast of the disturbance
to money demand. Provided that the Central Bank’s
forecast is private, the following analysis is relevant. Fur-
thermore, the private information could be in terms of a
forecast about a supply shock or the Central Bank’s
preferences. The qualitative results to follow would not be
affected. Also, It should be noted that the present model
differs from Canzoneri’s (1985) model in that the timing of
the forecast here is such that, if the Central Bank released
this information, it could be used by the public. The
assumed sequence of events, shown in figure 1, is
necessary for the analysis of imprecise announcements
below.
6Note that equation 7 implies that the Central Bank is
infinitely-lived. This assumption is only important for the
discussion of reputational considerations below, This
discussion would be qualitatively the same if, instead, the
Central Bank lived only a finite number of periods, T, pro-
vided that T is not known with certainty. In this case, fi
would reflect the Central Bank’s chances of survival as
well as its time preference. See Grossman and Van Huyck
(1988), for example.
Figure 1





timeobjective to stabilize output, however, is consis-
?~C~:~First~BestSr;Iuthan
tent with the public’s objective to forecast infla-
tion correctly only if the Central Bank’s target
for output equals the natural level. But, in this
case, the interesting issues revolving around
monetary policy secrecy do not arise.
As in much of this literature, then, the pre-
sent analysis assumes that y’ >y’. That is to say,
the Central Bank prefers output to exceed the
public’s target. Possible interpretations of this
assumption could stem from either social welfare
or self-interest considerations.’ It is only impor-
tant for the present analysis that the natural
output level or the public’s target for output be
different than the Central Bank’s (given) target.
This assumption implies that the Central Bank
does not have enough instruments to reach its
two goals, giving rise to a credibility problem in
policy as illustrated below.
Using equations 3, 5 and 7b and noting that
the public’s expectations for inflation, rr~,equals
g~—d~, the Central Bank’s utility in period t can
be written as
(8) u,=
where A’=y’—y”>O and d~=O,without any an-
nouncements by the Central Bank about its
private forecast. The Central Bank’s problem is
to choose g, to maximize the expected value of
its lifetime utility, after the markets set wage
growth equal to expected inflation, it:. The solu-
tion depends on how the Central Bank treats
the markets’ expectations.
To see why the Central Bank might want to
disclose its private information (that is, its
forecast of the money demand disturbance),
consider the benchmark case wherein the Cen-
tral Bank recognizes the impact it can have on
the markets’ expectations and d, is public infor-
mation. Furthermore, assume that the Central
Bank can make binding commitments to pursue
an announced policy. In this case, it chooses g,,
subject to the restriction that expectations are
consistent with its policy, to maximize its ex-
pected lifetime utility. Because of the stationary
(time-independent) nature of the model, this
maximization problem reduces to a sequence of
one-period problems, in which the Central Bank
chooses g, to maximize its expected one-period
utility, shown in equation 8, for each period t.
Given the constraint that g, = g:, creating sur-
prise inflation in an effort to increase output
above its natural level is precluded. Rather, the
Central Bank commits itself to the following
policy:
(9) ~,=n’+d,,
where ~ for all t. Note equation 9 implies
that, on average, inflation would be equal to the
Central Bank’s target rate. Because the policy
fully accommodates the part of the disturbance
to money demand predicted by the Central Bank,
= it’ and wage growth is set equal to ir’.~
The Central Bank’s expected one-period utility
in this regime can be found using equations &
‘See Barro and Gordon (1963) and Canzoneri (1985) for a
discussion of possible social-welfare interpretations of this
assumption. These interpretations build on existing distor-
tions in the economy. For example, the existence of large
unions that keep real wages too high or the use of income
taxes that influence labor decisions depress average out-
put (or the natural level) below the “potential” level (or
that level considered desirable from a social-welfare
perspective). Although these distortions could be modeled
explicitly here, the associated modifications would add un-
necessary complexity to the model without providing much
insight into the issues at hand. But see Cukierman (1986)
for a usetui critique of the sooial-wetfare interpretation.
Cukierman (1986) also provides an extensive discussion of
a political interpretation. For example, although the Central
Bank might be an independent institution, it might feel
compelled, in order to preserve its existence or in-
dependence, to react to signals by the fiscal authority. The
fiscal authority might be motivated to stimulate the
economy to enhance its chances for re-election.
wages were set, so that 6~ still equaled zero. Because the
Central Bank fully accommodates d,, expected inflation, “:~
is independent of d, in this regime. This is not to say that
the Central Bank has no preferences about maintaining
the privacy of its forecast. As will become obvious, the
Central Bank wants to reveal its private forecast so that it
can obtain this outcome. Whether the Central Bank should
accommodate disturbances to the economy is a matter of
controversy. In this model, its motive to react to d, is com-
patible with the public’s interests. The public prefers the
Central Bank to react to its forecast, because such reac-
tions minimize the variance of the public’s forecast error.
An argument against such a policy, for example, would be
that it is destabilizing because the Central Bank’s
forecasts are inaccurate. As shown below, however, even
if its private forecasts are fairly accurate (provided that
of*0), the Central Bank might not find it desirable to react
to its forecast. (Given of, however, the more accurate the
torecast, the less likely the Centrai Bank would be willing
to sacrifice flexibility in policy.) The alternative argument
against flexibility in policy in this paper builds on the Cen-
tral Bank’s credibility problem.
81n fact, the same outcome wouid be obtained if the Central
Bank’s forecast were not known by the public until after‘1’
and 9, with the assumptions that g:=g, and
(10) E,{ti}= —(1+f)o—A’2,
for all t, where, as defined previously, q2
denotes the finite variance of the Central Bank’s
forecast error. It is equal to the variance of in-
flation and output in this regime. The contingent
policy in equation 9 is referred to as the first-
best solution since it yields the highest utility to
the Central Bank among those policies that are
consistent with the public’s expectations.
As demonstrated by Kydland and Prescott
(1977), however, the policy in equation 9 is not
“dynamically consistent.” That is, given the pub-
lic’s expectations, the Central Bank has an incen-
tive to deviate from the first-best policy. Specifi-
cally, given n7=n’, the Central Bank would
rather implement the following policy:
(11) gc~=it’+d,+A’I(1+f).
If the Central Bank could create surprise infla-
tion with the policy shown in equation It, it
could augment output above the natural level to
approach its target.°Such a “cheating” policy
would increase the Central Bank’s expected one-
period utility by A’21(i+f).
The .fvnp.k Solution
But, even if the Central Bank could break its
commitment to follow the first-best policy, cheat-
ing would be impossible as long as people can-
not be fooled. That is, rational people will always
anticipate the Central Bank’s incentive to cheat,
if it cannot make binding commitments.
To consider another solution, one that is more
likely to emerge as the equilibrium outcome
when the Central Bank has private information,
suppose the Central Bank ignores any impact
that it could have on the public’s expectations.
This is not to say that the Central Bank actually
fails to understand the impact of its actions on
the public’s actions that, in turn, influence its
own welfare. Rather, given the Central Bank’s
incentive to cheat, it cannot control the public’s
expectations directly unless it could somehow
be committed to follow an announced policy
and to disclose its private information truthful-
ly. Without being able to exploit the dependence
of its actions on the public’s actions, the Central
Bank chooses g, to maximize its expected one-
period utility, shown in equation 8, as if’ it were
not trying to influence g~ or d~.
Before the Central Bank sets g,, the public
specifies wage growth equal to its expectations
of inflation. Because the public understands the
Central Bank’s maximization problem, it forms
g: by taking an (unconditional) expectation of
the Central Bank’s first-order condition given by
(U) —2(g,—g~—d,+d~—A’)—zf(g,—d,—ir’)=0,
for each t. Even though the Central Bank
observes d, before the public forms its expecta-
tions, without any announcements, 60. Since
the public’s expectation of g, equals g; and its
expectation of 6, equals 6:, g:=~”+A’If.
People recognize the Central Bank’s incentive
to engineer surprise inflation so as to augment
output above its natural level. To proliect
themselves against a decline in their real wage,
then, people specify higher rates of wage
growth (equal to g~)than in the first-best solu-
tion with commitments. Given that specification,
the Central Bank’s policy, ~,, which is referred
to here as the “myopic” solution for reasons
that will become obvious later, is given by
(13) ~,=it’+d,+A’/f,
for each t. With the myopic policy, the Central
Bank fuily accommodates its prediction of the
money demand disturbance as in the first-best
solution. Further, the policy shown in equation
13 validates the public’s expectations, implying
an average inflation rate equal to it’ +A’If.
When the Central Bank acts as if it were ig-
noring the impact that it can have on the
public’s expectations, the best it can do is to
follow the policy shown in equation 13. This
policy, however, is myopic. Because it essentially
ignores the potential benefit of reducing the
public’s expectations for inflation, it generates
an “inflationary bias” for the economy. That is,
~The solution in equation 11 is found by substituting
g; —6; =t< into the Central Bank’s expected one-period utili-
ty function and maximizing that function with respect to g,.
(See the first-order condition below in equation 12.) The
Central Bank would follow the same cheating strategy if it
had not announced its private information before wages
were set. it should be noted that, since such cheating
strategies are not consistent with the public’s expecta-
tions, they are implausible equilibrium strategies and are
assumed not to be observed in equilibrium.inflation, on average, exceeds the Central Bank’s
target level by A’/f without the benefit of in-
creasing average output above the natural level.
It is important to note that the inflationary bias
would emerge even if d, were not private infor-
mation, as long as the Central Bank did not try
to influence the markets’ expectations.’°
The Central Bank’s expected one-period utility
in this regime can be found by using equations
8 and 13 with g~= n’+A’ff and d:=o:
(14) E, {ü}=—(1+fla~—(1+UJfflA’2,
for all t. Because the variance of inflation and
output are the same as in the first-best regime,
a,’, the only difference between equations 10
and 14, A”/f, is the Central Bank’s one-period
disutility of the inflationary bias or, equivalent-
ly, the inefficiency of taking the market’s expec-
tations as given. Note that the larger A’ (which
reflects the difference between the Central
Bank’s and the public’s target for output) and
the smaller f (the Central Bank’s preference for
inflation stability relative to output stability), the
larger is the inflationary bias.
The inflationary bias is not easily avoided
without the ability to make commitments. The
problem stems from the Central Bank’s incen-
tive to create surprise inflation. This incentive
to cheat, given expectations, ultimately stems
from the insufficient number of instruments
available to the Central Bank. In the present
model, the Central Bank has two objectives with
only one instrument. If it had two independent
instruments, the Central Bank could achieve
both of its goals simultaneously” Alternatively,
if the Central Bank “ignored” its goal of output
stabilization or f became infinitely large, then
the credibility problem would disappear and
there would be no inflationary bias in equilibri-
um.12 But, with an insufficient number of in-
struments, the Central Bank’s incentive to sur-
prise the public remains, making the first-best
policy dynamically inconsistent and not credible,




If the Central Bank did not possess any pri-
vate information, then a legislated rule could be
imposed to force the Central Bank to follow the
first-best policy. Even if it were not feasible to
enforce such a rule, the Central Bank could
recognize the importance of its “reputation” to
eliminate or mitigate the inflationary bias.’3
To see why its reputation could be important,
suppose the Central Bank announces that it will
always follow the first-best policy as shown in
equation 9. Further, assume that the public al-
ways expects the Central Bank to adhere to that
policy, provided that it never has cheated in the
past by having deviated from the first-best
policy. Through its policy actions, then, the Cen-
tral Bank can maintain a reputation for not
deliberately creating surprise inflation.
If, however, the Central Bank were to cheat,
then people would expect the Central Bank to
continue to cheat in the future. Once having
lost its reputation by cheating, the Central Bank
is “punished.” Anticipating that the Central Bank
will continue to cheat in the future because it
has done so in the past, people will incorporate
an inflationary bias into their wage specifica-
tion. Given this specification for expectations,
loIn this regime, as in the first-best outcome, expected infla-
tion is independent of d,, since d, is fully accommodated
by the myopic policy. Nevertheless, because the presence
of private information makes it difficult for the Central
Bank to avoid the inflationary bias, as discussed below, it
would like to be able to reveal its private forecast truthfully
and precisely. See, however, Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986) who show that the Central Bank might prefer to
maintain the secrecy of its private information when it can-
not control the growth of the money perfectly. In their
analysis, maintained secrecy about its changing
preferences permits the Central Bank to engineer inflation
surprises when desired.
liActual policy and expected policy are not independent in-
struments provided that the public is rational and forward-
looking. If it were not, however, the Central Bank would
optimally announce g~ =g, — A, where g, = it’ + d,, so that
the Central Bank could systematically fool the public. If the
public believed that announcement, the Central Bank’s ex-
pected one-period utility could increase to —(1 +f)of.
121f the objective function in (7) were interpreted as a social-
welfare function, then the analysis above suggests that ap-
pointing a “conservative” Central Banker (i.e., one whose
concern about pursuing a goal of inflation stability exceed-
ed that ofsociety) would enhance social welfare. See
Rogoff (1985) for a detailed discussion of this point. In-
deed, this is the thrust of Representative Stephen L.
Neal’s recently proposed legislation to make price stability
the ultimate objective of the Federal Reserve System (H-A.
Res. 409). But also see Neumann (1990) who argues that
strengthening the independence of the Central Bank could
similarly help to avoid the credibility problem in monetary
policy without explicitly imposing a goal of price stability
on the Central Bank.
135ee, for example, Barro and Gordon (1983)-the Central Bank can do no better than to
follow the myopic policy shown in equation 13
once having cheated. During the “punishment,”
the outcome would return to the myopic solu-
tion that includes the inflationary bias, A’/f.”
In some cases, the Central Bank’s concern for
its reputation can provide the same result as
binding commitments when there is no private
information. The critical condition is that the
expected long-term gain from eliminating the in-
flationary bias must always exceed the expected
short-term gain that could be realized by creat-
ing surprise inflation. The long-term gain is
simply the present discounted disutility of the
inflationary bias, J~ft (~) - The short-term
gain is the difference between the expected one-
period utility if the Central Bank were to cheat
and the expected one-period utility from adhering
to the first-best policy, A’ 2/(1 +0 Note that as the
Central Bank’s discount factor, j3, increases (that
is, as it cares more about the future), the ex-
pected long-term gain from maintained reputa-
tion is more likely to exceed the short-term gain
from cheating in the current period. Hence, as
/3 increases, the Central Bank’s concern for its
reputation is more likely to support the first-
best outcome.
Even if reputational considerations were not a
perfect substitute for binding commitments to
achieve the first-best outcome, they could still
diminish the magnitude of the equilibrium infla-
tionary bias. As long as the threat of punish-
ment is sufficiently large, the Central Bank will
be induced to adhere to the reputational policy
that involves a smaller (if not zero) inflationary
bias.’5 Hence, in the reputational equilibrium,
cheating is never observed.
The presence of private information, however,
greatly complicates this situation, influencing
the possibilities for cheating. Specifically, because
the public does not observe d, (the Central
Bank’s private forecast) directly, it can never be
certain that the Central Bank has actually imple-
mented the reputational policy that depends on
d,. The public can easily verify that money
growth equals the Central Bank’s announced
reputational policy. But the public cannot be
sure that the Central Bank’s announcement
about d, is truthful. Indeed, as shown below,
the Central Bank has an incentive to misrepre-
sent its private information.
~flIi3%V 5fl5: PRECISE ANNOIJNC&
M..E.NTS NOT F.EASI.ELE?
The existence of private information weakens
the ability of reputational considerations to
achieve the efficient outcome. This can be il-
lustrated by showing that it is impossible to
force the Central Bank to adhere to the first-
best policy, because the Central Bank cannot
make credible announcements that precisely
reveal its private information.
Suppose that the Central Bank could be forced
to adhere to a specified policy, but could not be
forced to reveal its private information credibly
and precisely.’~For example, the following rule
might be legislated:
14Making this reputational mechanism effective, in the pre-
sent model, requires that the Central Bank is infinitely-
lived or has a finite but uncertain lifetime, which is consis-
tent with the Central Bank’s objective function shown in
(7). If the Central Bank were to live a finite and certain
number of periods, T, then it would always cheat in the
last period, T. But, if the public expects such behavior, the
period T outcome would just be the myopic solution. Along
this line of reasoning, the solution unravels and the
reputational mechanism cannot diminish the inflationary
bias below ~If. Alternatively, if the Central Bank were
finitely lived, but its preferences were private information
(e.g., the value of the parameter f), the Central Bank
could “build” credibility as an inflation-fighter by signaling
with monetary policy actions. See, for example, Backus
and DriffilI (1985).
“Suppose, for example, that the Central Bank announces
g, = k ++ d,, where k is the average inflation in ex-
cess of the optimal rate (OsksA’/f) and d, is public infor-
mation. (Note that when k=0, this policy is simply the
first-best one and when k=A7f the policy is the myopic
one.) Provided that k’cAVf, the temptation for the Central
Bank to cheat, given by (A2+f2k2_2fAk)/(1 +f), will be
positive but will decrease as k increases. The general con-
dition for reputational considerations to work is that this




which is also positive as long as k.cL’/f. This gain also
decreases as k increases. Even if the expected present
discounted gain from maintained cooperation is smaller
than the Central Bank’s temptation to cheat for k=0, the
reputational equilibrium inflationary bias, k, can be less
than /f/f, if the temptation decreases faster than the ex-
pected present discounted gain as kcA’/f increases.
“That there is no separate mechanism to force the Central
Bank to reveal its private information might seem puzzling.
For example, in the United States, Congress or the Ad-
ministration could set up an agency to monitor the Central
Bank’s activities and take part in formulating monetary
policy, whereby the private forecasts can be revealed to
the public. Why such an arrangement is not adopted is
beyond the scope of this analysis.If)
(15) ~t=n’+d~,
for all t, where dt denotes the Central Bank’s
announcement of its private forecast. If that an-
nouncement were believed by the public, the
public would form the following expectations:
g;=n’ +d~and u~=n’.With these expectations,
before setting its policy in period t, the Central
Bank would announce optimally
(16) d~=d,+A’/(1+f).
If the public were to believe the Central Bank’s
announcement, the Central Bank would be able
to disguise its cheating policy (shown in equa-
tion 11) as the first-best policy by overstating
the value of its forecast.17 In this case, the Cen-
tral Bank could drive output above its natural
level by A’/(l+f).
But, as in the case of simple cheating, the
Central Bank’s incentive to lie, which also fun-
damentally stems from its incentive to create
surprise inflation, will be fully recognized; as a
result, no one will believe the announcement.
Given that the public cannot determine with
certainty whether or not d~ = d,, it can do no
better than to protect itself from surprise infla-
tion by setting wage growth equal to it’ +A*/f.18
Because the Central Bank’s forecast is private
information, a legislative approach depending on
that information is not effective in achieving a
better outcome than the myopic solution.”
Similarly, the Central Bank’s private information
obscures the relevance of reputational con-
siderations to improve upon the myopic out-
come, Although people can see whether the
Central Bank has implemented its announced
policy—for example, the policy shown in equa-
tion 15—they cannot verify that its announce-
ment truly reflects the value of its private
forecast (that is, dt=dj, unless the forecast
were always perfect (that is, e,= 0 for all t).
Hence, the public cannot evaluate the Central
Bank’s reputation based on past policy actions.
A. CONSTANT MONEY CPO9T~UII
R1.JLE A.LNI) TIlE ROLE OF NOSY
1j I FMF
Although the Central Bank cannot make credi-
ble announcements that precisely state its private
information, it can make announcements that
have some informational content. In a recent
study, Stein (1989) applies the work of Crawford
and Sobel (1982) to show that, through noisy
announcements or “cheap talk,”the Central Bank
can reveal its private information partially. In his
application, where the Central Bank’s private in-
formation concerns its objective for the target
exchange rate, Stein illustrates how the Central
Bank can make announcements of a range in
which its target falls. Because the announce-
ment does not state the exact value of the Cen-
tral Bank’s target, it is a noisy announcement.
These announcements are a costless form of
communication in that no resources are used in
making them. But the announcements are credi-
ble because the Central Bank would incur an
implicit cost if it were to lie. This cost is suffi-
ciently large to induce the Central Bank to reveal
its private information truthfully, though not
precisely.
An application of Crawford and Sobel’s (1982)
analysis to the present model, however, shows
that noisy announcements might not be as
“cheap” as Stein’s (1989) analysis would suggest.
llThis can be seen by substituting equation 16 into equation
15. To verify that equation 16 is the optimal announce-
ment, substitute equation 14 into the Central Bank’s one-
period utility function (8) and choose ~t o maximize the
expected value of (8) subject to the public’s expectations
g~—d~=n’. The Central Bank would lie in the same manner
if it were not necessary to make its announcement until
after the policy was implemented.
“To see this, note if the Central Bankwere to act on its in-
centive to create surprise inflation given the public’s ex-
pectations, it would set its policy optimally to satisfy the
first-order condition in equation 12. Rearranging equation
12 and using E,(d,) = d,, one can verify the following:
g = g~—d~ + fif-i.A’ + d.
1÷f li-f
Noting that g, — d, equals the Central Bank’s expectation





Since E,(iij>ir forni fi-/f/f, the Central Bank always
has an incentive to create surprise inflation unless the
public incorporates the inflationary bias A’/f into its wage
specification.
19Garfinkel and Oh (1990a) have shown how a legislative ap-
proach that is independent of the Central Bank’s private
forecast can achieve a better outcome than the myopic
solution studied above. With a multi-period (N periods)
average targeting procedure, requiring ~ g, = Nit’, the
Central Bank can diminish the magnitude of the infla-
tionary bias that emerges in equilibrium. This procedure is
not efficient, however, in that it necessarily limitsthe Cen-
tral Bank’s flexibility to stabilize output and inflation.
Nevertheless, it can permit more flexibility than a strict
constant money growth rule.
FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF St WIASIn contrast to the present model, Stein’s model
implies that, if it were possible to force the Cen-
tral Bank to reveal its exchange rate target truth-
fully and precisely, then the first-best outcome
could be obtained. Accordingly, noisy announce-
ments alone can easily achieve a better outcome
than no announcements or complete secrecy.
The credibility problem in monetary policy in
the present framework, however, is slightly
more complicated. As indicated above, even if it
were possible to make the Central Bank reveal
its private forecast truthfully and precisely, im-
posing an additional restriction on policy either
through a legislative rule or reputational con-
siderations would be necessary to ensure that
the Central Bank follow the first-best policy. That
is, even if the public’s expectations, g~and n~,
included information about d,, the Central Bank
would have an incentive to surprise the public
(according to equation 12) unless iz~also were to
incorporate the inflationary bias, A’/f.2°But the
Central Bank has no motivation to reveal d, if it
cannot reduce or eliminate the inflationary bias
in doing so. Similarly, the Central Bank’s incen-
tive to create surprise inflation would not disap-
pear if it were to make noisy announcements
about its private forecast and could contaminate
those announcements.
A lfonstant J~cq(nT Growth R.ote
Because of this incentive to surprise the
market with inflation, limiting the degree of flex-
ibility permitted in monetary policy is necessary
to ensure that the announcements contain some
information while allowing the Central Bank to
avoid the inflationary bias. In other words, a
rule for monetary policy must be imposed to
“tie” the hands of the Central Bank, As indicated
above, for this constraint to be effective, the
rule must be independent of the private infor-
mation.21 For example, legislation could require
(17) g~=n’.
Although this constant money growth rule
eliminates the inflationary bias, it precludes any
(otherwise desirable) reactions to the part of
money demand disturbances predicted by the
Central Bank.22 As such, this rule produces a
higher variance of the public’s forecast error
for inflation and, hence, a higher variance of
output than in both the first-best and myopic
regimes.
The Central Bank’s expected utility under this
regime without any announcements is given by
(18) E,{ü}= —(1+0a~—A’2,
for all t. Expected utility in this regime will ex-
ceed that under the myopic regime only if
002
This condition underscores the Central Bank’s
trade-off between eliminating the inflationary
bias and eliminating flexibility in monetary policy
with the constant money growth rule - The
larger is the inflationary bias that emerges in
the myopic outcome (that is, the smaller f andlor
the larger A’), the more likely this condition will
be satisfied. The Central Bank is less likely, how-
ever, to prefer a constant money growth rule
over the myopic policy the larger the variance
of the component of the money demand distur-
bance predicted by the Central Bank, a~, which
captures the expected benefit of being able to
react to d,. Because the legislated rule in equa-
tion 17 does not permit the Central Bank to
react to its forecast of the disturbance to money
demand to stabilize inflation, the variance of in-
flation and output increase to o~,Nevertheless,
if the possible benefits of maintained flexibility
are not too large (that is, if o~is small), the Cen-
tral Bank might prefer to be constrained not to
react to its private forecast to avoid the infla-
tionary bias.
it is important to note that, even with this
rule, the Central Bank still would not precisely
reveal its forecast. In particular, given g,=rr’,
the Central Bank would want to overstate the
value of its forecast according to
(19) d~=d,+A’.
20See footnote 18.
21Whether it is possible to enforce a legislated rule is
beyond the scope of this paper. Of course, reputational
considerations might be able to support the same rule. To
simplify the discussion, the analysis assumes that it is
possible to enforce a legislated rule that does not depend
on the Central Bank’s private information.
221f there were another shock, say, in the supply equation,
and the Central Bank’s information about this shock were
not private, then the legislated rule could provide flexibility
to react to this shock. Moreover, not all flexibility needs to
be removed from policy in this model. The constant money
growth rule is not the only way to tie the hands of the
monetary authority to make the announcements mean-
ingful. The imposition of a multi-period average targeting
rule that permits some flexibility would also work; however,
with this constraint, the inflationary bias would not be
eliminated totally. See Garfinkel and Oh (1990a).
199)Equation 19 illustrates again that the credibility
problem of monetary policy is not easily resolved
in the presence of private information. But if d,
were not private information, the Central Bank’s
expected one-period utility with a constant
money growth rule would be
(20) E,{ii}=_fo~—A’1.
Hence, the Central Bank would prefer to disclose
d, under a constant money growth rule even
though it cannot do so precisely.
Noisy Announcements
By making noisy announcements about its
forecast, the Central Bank could enhance its
own welfare under the rule. Given that it must
follow the rule in equation 17, the Central Bank
cannot actively pursue its goal to stabilize infla-
tion and output by reacting to d,. Making noisy
announcements, as an alternative policy tool,
permits the Central Bank to pursue its goal of
stabilizing output, Specifically, the Central Bank
could partly influence expectations by announc-
ing a range in which its forecast falls, thereby
reducing the variance of the public’s inflation
forecast error and, in turn, reducing the vari-
ance of output.
To take a concrete example, suppose that the
Central Bank announces that d, lies either bet-
ween —D and a or between a and D.23 For any
announcement to contain some information
about d,, the Central Bank must perceive that
lying is costly. The cost, however, cannot be
directly imposed by the market upon observing
6, because, as mentioned earlier, the market
cannot infer the true value of d, from that ob-
servation. Rather, the cost of lying about d, is
implicitly contained in how such a lie would af-
fect the market’s expectations about d,.
Suppose the Central Bank were to announce
that d, fell in the higher range, [a,D]. Given that
announcement and the money growth rule
shown in equation 17, the market forms an ex-
pectation about future inflation. This expecta-
tion would equal the Central Bank’s target rate
of inflation, ir’, minus the expected value of d~
given that it lies somewhere between a and D.
Call this conditional expectation dh - On the other
hand, if the Central Bank announced that d, fell
in the lower range, [—D,al, the market would
expect a higher inflation rate equal to the dif-
ference between r’ and the expected value of
d, given that it falls somewhere between —D
and a, Call this conditional expectation dL
If d, is greater than —D but less than a, then
the Central Bank’s expected one-period utility by
announcing d, £ [—D,a] must be greater than or
equal to that by claiming d, £ [a,D1 for the
former announcement to be credible, That is,
(21) ~~E,{(dL_d,_E,_A~)2} _E,{(dh_d,_c,_A’)2}.
The inequality in equation 21 would be reversed
if d, were greater than a and less than D. Final-
ly, if d, = a, then the Central Bank must be indif-
ferent between announcing the higher and
lower ranges.
This last condition can be used to determine
the dividing point of the distribution of d,, a,
such that for all possible values of d,, the Cen-
tral Bank’s announcement is credible. The deter-
mination of the dividing point from that condi-
tion ensures that the Central Bank will not act
on its motive to lie about the range in which d,
falls. For example, when d, is in the lower range,
the Central Bank will not announce that d, is in
the upper range. If it did so, the public’s infla-
tionary expectations would fall by a sufficiently
large amount that, in turn, drives output too far
from the Central Bank’s output target and, hence,
renders lying undesirable,
By making noisy announcements about its
private forecast while adhering to the constant
money growth rule, the Central Bank can en-
hance its expected utility above what it would
be when it simply follows the rule. This is not
to say that the Central Bank will always choose
to make noisy announcements. As illustrated
with a more specific example in the appendix,
the Central Bank would prefer to maintain full
discretion and secrecy, the more it cares about
inflation stability, the less the difference between
its and the public’s output goals, and the more
accurate the private forecast.24
The basic intuition here is essentially the same
as that used when discussing the merits of a
23See the appendix for a more detailed example. Also see
Garfinkel and Oh (lg9Ob).
24Again, see Garfinkel and Oh (l990b). Their analysis pro-
duces a somewhat surprising result: under the conditions
that noisy announcements are more likely to be preferred
by the Central Bank, the credibility problem is more severe
so that, at the same time, these announcements cannot be
particularly informative.
n~r~e~zrn,~? ~ r,,~ ~?~‘r13
simple constant money growth rule over those
of the myopic policy. The presence of private
information forces the Central Bank to face a
new trade-off between removing the inflationary
bias and limiting flexibility in policy. But the
money growth rule with noisy announcements
is more likely to dominate the myopic policy
than the rule by itself. Although both output
and inflation will have a greater variance in the
regime with noisy announcements than in the
myopic regime, the variance of output will be
smaller in this regime than when the Central
Bank simply follows a constant money growth
rule. The elimination of the inflationary bias
possible with the constant money growth rule,
combined with the slight reduction in the vari-
ance of output possible with noisy announce-
ments, provide the main benefits that would
make abandoning the myopic policy—that is,
maintaining complete secrecy with full discre-
tion—desirable from the Central Bank’s
perspective.
CONc.LUD1NG REMARKS
This article has examined the possibility of ful-
ly or at least partially removing secrecy in mone-
tary policy. In the context of a model in which
the Central Bank has an incentive to create sur-
prise inflation, the Central Bank would like to
reveal its private information, whereby it could
easily avoid an inflationary bias. The Central
Bank’s private information combined with its in-
centive to surprise individuals gives rise to a
credibility problem in monetary policy that is
nearly impossible to resolve. Neither reputational
considerations nor binding commitments to
force the Central Bank to adhere to the first-
best policy are effective in improving upon the
myopic solution if the public never directly ob-
serves the Central Bank’s private information,
Although the Central Bank cannot make
precise announcements, it can make announce-
ments that partially reveal its private informa-
tion. By announcing a range in which its forecast
falls and adhering to the constant money growth
rule, the Central Bank can avoid the inflationary
bias and influence the market’s expectations in
a discrete way to lower output variability below
that generated by a simple constant money
growth rule alone. Nevertheless, some secrecy
remains.
Moreover, the Central Bank might prefer to
maintain complete secrecy. Unlike Stein’s (1989)
result that there is always room for improve-
ment with noisy announcements, in the context
of the more general model developed here, noisy
announcements require constraints on flexibility
that can be permitted in the conduct of
monetary policy—for example, a legislated con-
stant money growth rule. The constraints are
costly if they preclude desirable reactions to
disturbances in the economy.
More generally, the analysis suggests that leg-
islation requiring the Fed to disclose the FOMC’s
decisions immediately after its meeting might be
of little value. If the Central Bank has private
information about the economy that influences
its decisions and has an incentive to surprise
the public, it will not release this information
truthfully and precisely. The Central Bank’s in-
centive to misrepresent its private information
detracts from the value of any information it
releases.
That noisy announcements can work in en-
hancing the efficiency of monetary policy only
under restrictive conditions prompts a general
but more fundamental conclusion. In the pres-
ence of private information, the Central Bank
faces a trade-off between higher-than-desired
average inflation and limited flexibility. Without
eliminating the ultimate source of the credibility
problem—namely, that the Central Bank has too
few tools to achieve its ultimate goals—this con-
sequence of the strategic considerations of mon-
etary policy is not easily avoided.
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which d, falls, it must always be indifferent be-
tween announcing the ranges, [—D,a,] and [a,,D]
when d,=a,.
Formally, this condition, called the “arbitrage
condition,” is written as
(A2) E,[ü([ — D,a,), djJ = E,[üffa ,,D], dj},
or equivalently,
-D+a
__________ — a, —E,—A)2} =
2
D+a
_____ — a, _E,_A*\2)13, 2
where d, = a,. For this condition to be satisfied,
a, must equal —2A’.
The basic idea here is that, given that the
Central Bank must follow the constant money
growth rule, its incentive to lie depends on its
‘Hence, the probability that d~=d, where dis any possible
realization of 6,, is the same for any value of 6: ll2D. The
distributions of d, and i, are not specified here. They need
only be independent random variables with zero means
and finite variances that sum to the variance of 6,. See
Crawford and Sobel (1982) for a more general analysis of
the noisy announcement equilibrium.
2See Garfinkel and Oh (199Db) for a derivation of a more
general noisy announcement equilibrium of size n in this
framework. (In this particular example, with n=2, a,= —D
and a,=D.)forecast. The dividing point a,, determined from
the arbitrage condition, implies that if the Cen-
tral Bank were to overstate the value of its fore-
cast, when d,<a,, it would have to do so by an
amount so large that it is too costly to lie.
Note that the dividing point is such that for
d,<a, the announcement is more precise—that
is, informative. More generally, when there are
n steps, the subintervals become longer as they
move away from the lower bound. For example,
consider when there are two dividing points, a,
and a2. In this case, the arbitrage condition re-
quires a,= —D/3—4A’ and a2=D/3—4fr’. The
length of the first interval from — D to a, equals
2D/3 — 4A’; the length of the next interval equals
2D/3; and, the length of the last interval equals
2D/3 + 4A’ - When the disturbance is smaller
(closer to —D), the Central Bank’s incentive to
overstate the value of the forecast is smaller.
Although a constant money growth rule is not
first-best in that it does not permit (otherwise
desirable) reactions to the Central Bank’s fore-
casts of money demand disturbances, it does
eliminate the inflationary bias. When the Cen-
tral Bank also makes noisy announcements, it
can enhance its expected welfare above that
with a simple constant money growth rule, With
only one dividing point, its expected one-period
utility is given by:
(A3) iTi = —(6 A~2+D2(f+~fl/3,
which is always greater than the Central Bank’s
utility when it simply follows a constant money
growth rule, provided that A’ <D/2.3 Note that
this condition will be satisfied by the require-
ment that a,> —D. More generally, noisy an-
nouncements with any number of dividing
points (greater than or equal to 1) will always
be better than a simple constant money growth
rule provided that the first step is greater than
In addition, the Central Bank’s utillty under
this regime can be greater than that under the
myopic regime. In the present example, this
condition is given by
(A4) D2(a2(l +40— 3(1 — afl112 < A2(l —0/f,
where a2
= &d/OJ with 0<a< l.~The parameter a
captures the degree of accuracy of the Central
Bank’s forecast. As a approaches 1, the Central
Bank’s forecast is generally more accurate,
The condition in (A4) is weaker than that for
a strict rule to dominate the myopic policy. Nev-
ertheless, this condition is quite strong, reflecting
the idea that, although the inflationary bias can
be avoided, the resulting loss of flexibility in
this regime can be costly. In fact, when the
monetary authority’s forecast is extremely ac-
curate (that is, a approaches 1), a sufficient con-
dition for the myopic policy to dominate the
constant money growth rule with noisy an-
nouncements and one dividing point, a,, is simp-
ly that f>-i. If the Central Bank cares more
about inflation stability than about output stabil-
ity (and its forecast is extremely accurate), then
it will not prefer noisy announcements, with a,,
over the myopic pollcy. When a is close to 1, it
can be shown that, given that f>i, noisy an-
nouncements with any number of partitions will
not be desired by the Central Bank.”
Nevertheless, noisy announcements might en-
hance the Central Bank’s utility if f< 1. Even if
a strict constant money growth rule without
3See Garfinkel and Oh (199Db), who show that, for a
general noisy announcement equilibrium of size n, the
Central Bank’s expected one-period utility is given by ü, =
—(~“(n’ + 2) + D’(f+ 1/n’))/a. Under the specifications for
the distribution of 6,, the one-period expected utility for the
Central Bank is —(1 + f) D’l3 — A” when it follows a simple
constant money growth rule. This can be easily verified by
either using the above expression for expected utility with
n = I or by using equation 18 and noting that the variance
of a random variable which has a uniform distribution
bounded by x, and x, is given by (x,—x,)’/12.
~Thisno-nonsense condition is automatically satisfied by
the requirement that the partition equilibrium of size n is
feasible. See Garfinkel and Oh (199Db).
“in the myopic regime, the Central Bank’s one-period ex-
pected utility is —(1 +fi(1 —a’)D’13 —(1 ÷(1/f))A’2 since, by
the definition of of 1 —a
2
=of/of.
“See Garfinkel and Oh (199Db). The intuition here, as
discussed in the main text, follows simply from the trade-
off between the benefits of reducing the inflationary bias
and the benefits of maintained flexibility. Assuming that a
is sufficiently close to 1, the larger is f, the smaller is the
inflationary bias that emerges in the myopic regime and
the smaller is the benefit of avoiding the inefficiency of
that bias relative to the expected costs of not reacting to
money demand disturbances. In the case that the elasticity
of output with respect to unanticipated inflation were not
equal to 1, the sufficient condition for the Central Bank to
prefer the myopic policy is that f be greater than the
square of that elasticity. The smaller that elasticity, the
greater the likelihood of the Fed preferring the myopic
policy. For example, ifthe elasticity were equal to 1/2,
then f>1/4 would imply that the myopic policy dominates
the constant money growth rule with noisy
announcements.any announcements does not dominate the myo-
pic policy, there can be room for improvement
with noisy announcements and the strict rule.
In the case of one dividing point, there can be
room for improvement provided that f< i/2
even when the private forecasts are extremely
accurate (that is, a is close to one). More
generally, the condition in equation A4 implies
that noisy announcements are more likely to be
preferred over no announcements with full flex-
ibility in monetary policy, the less accurate the
Central Bank’s forecast (when there is a smaller
desire for flexibifity in monetary policy). Fur-
ther, the larger the difference between the out-
put goals of the Central Bank and the publlc
and the smaller the Central Bank’s relative pre-
ferences for inflation stability, the Central Bank
is less likely to prefer complete secrecy over
noisy announcements.